Chapter 152 Malashenko's Plan
In early 1941, when the Soviet-German War had just broken out, the vast majority of Soviet tank design teams, as well as Soviet high-level commanders and political leaders, had not yet had a clear and accurate understanding of the research and development capabilities and upgrading capabilities of the German armored forces.
Since the German army won the blitzkrieg against Europe, completely conquered France and drove the British back to their homeland and expelled them from the European continent, the main equipment of its armored forces has not been substantially upgraded and improved.
The early No. 4 tank equipped with a 24-caliber short-barreled 75mm main gun was the most advanced main tank model in the German armored forces until the launch of Operation Barbarossa.
This type of short-barreled gun No. 4 tank, together with the No. 3 tank, formed the absolute main force of the German armored forces at the launch of Operation Barbarossa, and was also the most direct cause of the German army's weak performance in the face of the "T34 crisis".
The excellent and reliable T34 tanks and the poor quality disadvantage of the German armored forces made the senior commanders and high-level leaders of the Soviet army and the party, government and army have a dangerous idea of being too arrogant, thinking that the quality advantage of the Soviet tanks will continue in the face of the slow progress of the German tanks.
This extremely dangerous and overly arrogant idea undoubtedly put the entire Soviet tank force in an extremely unfavorable development prospect.
Various improved main tank plans were killed one by one because of poor design quality or because they could not meet the most important requirements of large-scale mass production during wartime.
The design and development of new tanks was repeatedly delayed because the quality advantage of the front-line tank units still existed. After the outbreak of the war, the Soviet tank design bureau had no design drawings of a new main tank except for those modified design drawings around existing models.
In sharp contrast, the German army was always shrouded in the haze of the T34 crisis.
Compared with the poor development of the Soviet main tank models that have not been fundamentally improved and replaced, the German army, which immediately encountered the T34 crisis after the start of Operation Barbarossa, quickly woke up from its dream.
Realizing that the old tanks in its hands were no longer sufficient to cope with the war situation, Germany quickly summoned a large number of military enterprises including Rheinmetall, Krupp, Porsche, Henschel, MAN and many other German military giants, and immediately launched actions to deal with the T34 crisis.
Regarding the plan to deal with the Soviet T34 crisis, the Germans, after taking a comprehensive view of the overall situation, chose two completely different paths, one fast and one slow, and started to proceed simultaneously.
First of all, the classic truth that distant water cannot quench near thirst also applies to the German front-line troops that have now set foot in the Soviet war quagmire.
The new German tanks that are enough to completely deal with the Soviet main tanks have a too long cycle from bidding and research and development to design completion and finalization and production.
During this period, the German front-line armored forces that have entered a state of war need to continue to take on combat missions and confront the Soviet army. It has become the top priority for the Germans to make the existing German armored forces equipped with the ability to fight against the Soviet main tanks before their new tanks are put into actual combat.
After a hasty and rigorous bidding discussion meeting, the important task of transforming the existing main tanks to enable them to cope with the Soviet T34 crisis finally fell on the shoulders of the old German military giants Krupp and Rheinmetall.
After half a year of unremitting efforts, Krupp and Rheinmetall finally handed over a satisfactory answer to the German military with a strong cooperation attitude - KWK40 75mm 43-caliber long-barreled tank gun.
The improved No. 4 tank equipped with this powerful new main gun was soon given the official equipment name of the No. 4 tank F2 by the German military, and was put into the front-line battlefield with the expectation of a life-saving straw.
After rushing into the Soviet-German battlefield in early 1942, the Panzer IV F2 did live up to expectations. The powerful new long-barreled 75mm main gun was enough to destroy the Soviet T34 tank from the front within the conventional combat distance and seriously threaten the KV series heavy tanks. This made the German army regain a point in the armored confrontation with the Soviet army for the first time since the launch of Operation Barbarossa.
On the other hand, the research and development of new main tanks was carried out simultaneously.
The "Panzer VI" project developed by Porsche and Henschel and the "Panzer V" project undertaken by MAN were carried out simultaneously.
The crystallization of German tanks born from these two projects was the famous Panzer VI heavy tank and Panther V medium tank.
However, it is too early to discuss the actual debut time of these two German tanks with powerful combat performance in 1941.
At this moment, what Malashenko hoped to change the most was to attract the attention of the Soviet tank design bureau and the military and political leaders to the development plan of the new main tank as soon as possible.
According to the original historical trend, the Soviet army, which always believed that its tank quality advantage would be maintained, did not wake up from the dream until the German army put the Tiger VI heavy tank into actual combat for the first time in the direction of Leningrad in 1942. This was a powerful and extremely amazing German war machine at the time.
The Soviet army, realizing that its armored forces no longer had any advantages in either medium or heavy tanks, hastily launched the research and development plan for the next generation of main tanks.
However, from the perspective of later generations, the "Stalin" IS1/2 heavy tanks and T3485 medium tanks, which were put into actual combat at the end of the war in 1944, were a bit too late.
From August 1942, when the German army first put the Tiger tank into actual combat, to the beginning of 1944, when the IS2 heavy tank and T3485 medium tank were successively put into mass production and officially participated in the war, it took more than a year.
The Soviet tank forces, which were completely behind the German armored forces in terms of tank quality, suffered unimaginable heavy losses in more than a year.
And one of the main reasons for this is that the Soviet army's research and development plan for new main tanks was repeatedly delayed and shelved. This wasted the precious research and development time of more than a year from the launch of Operation Barbarossa to the appearance of the Tiger tank, which made the German armored forces almost invincible in the tactical crushing in 1943.
"If we want to put the IS series heavy tanks and T3485 medium tanks into actual combat early, we must find a high-ranking official as an entry point. I must climb up the line of Zhukov!"
Malachenko thought as he was still talking to Zhukov in front of him.